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OPINION 
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SMITH, Chief Judge.    
Appellants, Crystal Spring Ecosystem, Highland 
Township Municipal Authority, and Citizens Advocating 
a Clean Healthy Environment, Inc.—all represented by 
the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund 
(“CELDF”)—sought to intervene on the side of 
Defendant-Appellee Township of Highland (the 
“Township”) in defense of the legality of the Highland 
municipal ordinance known as the “Community Bill of 
Rights.”  The Community Bill of Rights, among other 
things, prohibited Plaintiff-Appellee Seneca Resources 
Corporation from using a well to store waste from 
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fracking.1  The District Court2 denied Appellants’ motion 
to intervene, holding that the Township adequately 
represented Appellants’ interests in defending the 
                                           
 
1 “[F]racking[] is a method used to stimulate production 
of a well.  A specially blended liquid is pumped down the 
well and into a formation under pressure high enough to 
cause the formation to crack open, forming passages 
through which oil or gas can flow into the wellbore.”  
T.W. Philips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 
n.1 (Pa. 2012); see also U.S. EPA, Hydraulic Fracturing 
for Oil and Gas: Impacts from the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Water Cycle on Drinking Water Resources in the United 
States 3–4 (2016) (executive summary), 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_downlo
ad_id=530285. 
2 On March 26, 2015, the parties filed consents to trial 
and jurisdiction before a magistrate judge.  See Seneca 
Res. Corp. v. Highland Township, No. 15-60 Erie, 2016 
WL 1213605, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2016) (“[T]he 
parties have voluntarily consented to have a United 
States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, 
including the entry of a final judgment.”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c).  Because the Magistrate Judge has the full 
power of the District Court, we refer to the Magistrate 
Judge as the District Court where appropriate.   
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Community Bill of Rights.  Appellants moved for 
reconsideration.  While the motion for reconsideration 
was pending, the Township repealed the Community Bill 
of Rights and entered into a settlement with Seneca that 
culminated in a consent decree adopted by the District 
Court.  Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of 
the Consent Decree, which the District Court denied 
along with Appellants’ motion for reconsideration of 
their motion to intervene.   
Appellants now appeal four orders: (1) the denial 
of their motion to intervene, (2) the denial of the motion 
for reconsideration of their motion to intervene, (3) the 
District Court’s adoption of the Consent Decree, and (4) 
the denial of the Appellants’ motion for reconsideration 
of the Consent Decree.  Appellants’ original motion to 
intervene is now moot because there is no longer an 
ordinance to defend.  In their reply brief and at oral 
argument, Appellants fell back on the argument that they 
had a right to intervene because the Consent Decree 
purportedly “establish[es] . . . the legality or illegality of 
[Appellants’] protected rights.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. 8.  
But the Consent Decree does not bind any of the 
Appellants nor does it deprive them of any rights after 
the Community Bill of Rights has been repealed.  
Because Appellants cannot intervene, they are 
nonparties.  Because they are nonparties, they cannot 
appeal the Consent Decree.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion for 
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reconsideration of the order denying intervention.  We 
lack jurisdiction to review the remaining three orders 
because of mootness and standing issues.   
BACKGROUND 
I. ACTORS 
Plaintiff-Appellee Seneca Resources Corporation 
is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in oil and natural 
gas exploration and production.  Seneca sought to 
convert a natural gas well in Highland Township into a 
Class II underground injection control well in which to 
store waste from fracking.   
Defendants-Appellees are Township of Highland 
and the Highland Board of Supervisors.  Highland is a 
township located in Elk County, Pennsylvania.  The 
Board of Supervisors is its three-person governing body.  
See 53 P.S. § 65601 (“Townships shall be governed and 
supervised by boards of supervisors.  Boards of 
supervisors shall consist of three members or, if approved 
by the electors under section 402(b), five members.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
CELDF advocates that communities pass laws that 
assert community rights against corporations and others 
engaged in activity disfavored by members of the 
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community.3  CELDF appears to have drafted the 
ordinance at issue here.  CELDF represented the 
Township earlier in this litigation, and a different CELDF 
lawyer has represented Appellants.  
Appellants are Crystal Spring Ecosystem, 
Highland Township Municipal Authority, and Citizens 
Advocating a Clean Healthy Environment, Inc. 
Crystal Spring Ecosystem “encompasses [a 
natural] spring, as well as the surrounding hillside and 
riparian forests, soils, and bedrocks, [and] the residents of 
James City who drink from Crystal Spring.”  Appellants’ 
Br. 21; accord App.197–98 (Mot. Intervene) ¶ 14.4 
                                           
 
3 See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the 
Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 959–60 
(2015) (referring to CELDF-sponsored antifracking 
legislation in Pittsburgh, Pa., Mora, N.M., and Lafayette, 
Colo.); Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Foreword: New 
Thinking on Sustainability, 13 N.Z. J. Pub. & Int’l L. 1, 
12 (2015) (“160 communities in the United States have 
adopted such rules that have been drafted by the 
CELDF . . . .”). 
4 Appellants claim that the Ecosystem has standing under 
the Community Bill of Rights.  Because of the way this 
appeal is terminated and because Citizens Advocating a 
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Highland Township Municipal Authority is a 
municipal government agency that provides water from 
Crystal Spring for unincorporated James City, a city 
within Highland Township.   
Citizens Advocating a Clean Healthy 
Environment, Inc. (“CACHE”) is a nonprofit corporation 
that “is, and has been, the primary advocate” for the 
Community Bill of Rights.  App.197 (Mot. Intervene) 
¶¶ 9–13.  Its three directors are residents of Highland 
Township who “own property in James City connected to 
the Municipal Authority water supply.”  App.197 (Mot. 
Intervene) ¶ 11.   
                                                                                              
 
Clean Healthy Environment, Inc., would be a proper 
intervenor were it to meet the standards under Rule 24(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we do not need 
to resolve whether an ecosystem can have standing or is a 
proper party under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Cf. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 
461, 466 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (“It is not disputed that the 
human plaintiffs have standing to sue under the ESA, and 
therefore we need not consider the standing to sue of the 
animals named as plaintiffs.”). 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 9, 2013, the Township enacted a far-
reaching ordinance that, among other things, prohibited 
“disposal injection wells” from existing within Highland.  
App.046–50 (2013 Ordinance).   
On June 17, 2014, the EPA issued a final, ten-year 
permit to Seneca to allow it to operate a Class II-D 
injection well.  Part 1.A of the permit says, “Issuance of 
this permit does not . . . authorize . . . any infringement of 
State or local law or regulations.”  App.082 (Permit).   
Sometime between November 3, 2014, and 
January 8, 2015, the Highland Township Board of 
Supervisors wrote to the EPA, stating that the EPA 
permit was invalid under the Township’s ordinance.  See 
App.095–96 (Letter). 
Seneca sued the Township and the Board of 
Supervisors on February 18, 2015, alleging that the 
ordinance was invalid.  Seneca sought damages, 
attorneys’ fees, and an injunction prohibiting the 
Township from enforcing the ordinance.  The Township 
and the Board of Supervisors were represented by 
CELDF lawyers. 
On March 24, 2015, the Township adopted the 
Community Bill of Rights as an amendment to the 
January 9, 2013 ordinance.  The Community Bill of 
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Rights established a right to water and clean air for 
persons, natural communities and ecosystems5 and stated 
that any resident could enforce an ecosystem’s rights “to 
exist and flourish.”  App.119 (Community Bill of 
Rights).  Section 3 of the Community Bill of Rights made 
it illegal for any corporation or government to deposit 
waste from “oil and gas extraction” “within Highland 
Township” and further claimed to invalidate any “permit, 
license, privilege, charter, or other authority” that 
violated the Community Bill of Rights.  App.120 
                                           
 
5 The Community Bill of Rights provided that: 
All residents, natural communities and ecosystems 
in Highland Township possess the right to 
sustainably access, use, consume, and preserve 
water drawn from natural water cycles that provide 
water necessary to sustain life within the 
Township. 
. . . All residents, natural communities, and 
ecosystems in Highland Township possess the 
right to breathe air untainted by toxins, 
carcinogens, particulates, and other substances 
known to cause harm to health. 
App.119 (Community Bill of Rights § 2(a)–(b)).  
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(Community Bill of Rights).  Section 4(b) of the 
Community Bill of Rights stated that any resident could 
enforce the rights of the Township.  App.120 
(Community Bill of Rights).  Section 4(c) of the 
Community Bill of Rights stated that any resident of 
Highland Township could “enforce or defend the rights 
of ecosystems.”  App.120 (Community Bill of Rights).  
Section 5(a) of the Community Bill of Rights stated that 
“[c]orporations that violate this Ordinance, or that seek to 
violate this Ordinance, shall not be deemed to be 
‘persons’” and that those corporations did not have the 
“power to assert state or federal preemptive laws in an 
attempt to overturn” the Community Bill of Rights.  
App.120 (Community Bill of Rights).  The Community 
Bill of Rights called for “amendment of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and the federal Constitution to recognize a 
right to local self-government free from governmental 
preemption and or nullification by corporate ‘rights.’”  
App.121 (Community Bill of Rights).   
On April 6, 2015, Seneca filed an amended 
complaint.  The Amended Complaint took note of the 
Community Bill of Rights and further alleged that the 
Township told the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection that the original ordinance 
would preclude the DEP from issuing a state permit.  
Seneca claimed that the Township’s communication with 
the DEP was causing the DEP to delay issuance of the 
state permit.  The Amended Complaint alleged the same 
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claims and requested the same relief as the original 
complaint.  See App.106–15 (Am. Compl.).   
On August 11, 2015, Appellants, represented by a 
different CELDF lawyer than the lawyer who represented 
the Township and the Board of Supervisors, filed their 
motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to defend the 
legality of the ordinance.  See Oral Arg. at 7:04 
(“[Appellants] tried to come into this case on the side of 
the Government with the interests of defending the 
ordinance . . . .”).  
On December 31, 2015, one of the three members 
of the Board of Supervisors died. 
On March 29, 2016, the District Court denied the 
Appellants’ motion to intervene because Appellants 
failed to show that the Township and the Board of 
Supervisors did not adequately represent Appellants’ 
interests.  See Seneca Res. Corp. v. Highland Township, 
No. 15-60 Erie, 2016 WL 1213605, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 29, 2016). 
On April 26, 2016, Appellants moved for 
reconsideration of the March 29, 2016 order denying 
their motion to intervene.  Appellants alleged there had 
been “a material change in the relevant facts” because 
“the composition of the Highland Township Board of 
Supervisors changed.”  App.317 (Mot. Reconsideration 
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Denial Mot. Intervene).  According to Appellants, the 
new replacement supervisor expressed the view that the 
Community Bill of Rights was likely invalid and 
therefore the Board majority was opposed to continuing 
to defend the Community Bill of Rights.  Under these 
new circumstances, Appellants argued, the Township 
would no longer adequately represent Appellants’ 
interests.  App.318–19 (Mot. Reconsideration Denial 
Mot. Intervene).  On May 13, 2016, a CELDF lawyer 
filed a response to the motion for reconsideration on 
behalf of the Township and the Board of Supervisors.  In 
the response, the Township and the Board said that they 
supported the motion for reconsideration because “it is 
unlikely that the Township’s aggressive defense of the 
Ordinance will continue.”  App.345 (Response). 
On May 30, 2016, CELDF moved to withdraw as 
counsel of record for the Township and its Board of 
Supervisors.  CELDF claimed that Defendants “have 
ceased to communicate with their counsel, despite 
multiple attempts by counsel to contact the clients,” 
which apparently included the period during which 
Defendants filed their “response” supporting Appellants’ 
motion for reconsideration.  App.348–50 (Mot. 
Withdrawal).  On June 2, 2016, CELDF informed the 
court that Defendants said they were hiring new counsel.   
The Board of Supervisors repealed the Community 
Bill of Rights on the night of August 10, 2016. 
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The following day, Seneca and Defendants filed a 
stipulation and consent decree under which the Township 
stipulated that much of the Community Bill of Rights 
was “an impermissible exercise of Highland’s legislative 
authority,” “unconstitutional,” or “unenforceable.”  
App.388–89 (Stipulation and Consent Decree) ¶ 13(a)–
(g).6  Additionally, under the Consent Decree, the 
                                           
 
6 The relevant portions of the stipulation and consent 
decree state as follows:  
a. Section 3 of the Highland Community Bill Of 
Rights Ordinance, as amended (Amendment and 
Revision of Ordinance No. 1-9 of 2013) constitutes 
an impermissible exercise of Highland’s legislative 
authority and is therefore invalid and 
unenforceable; 
b. Section 3 of the Highland Community Bill Of 
Rights Ordinance, as amended (Amendment and 
Revision of Ordinance No. 1-9 of 2013) is also 
invalid and unenforceable in that it is de jure 
exclusionary in seeking to prohibit entirely the 
exercise of a legitimate and lawful business 
activity (to-wit, the development of oil and gas 
resources and the management of related waste 
materials); 
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c. Section 4(b) and (c) of the Highland Community 
Bill Of Rights Ordinance, as amended 
(Amendment and Revision of Ordinance No. 1-9 
of 2013) constitute an impermissible exercise of 
Highland’s legislative authority and are therefore 
invalid and unenforceable;  
d. Sections 5(a) and (b) of the Highland 
Community Bill Of Rights Ordinance, as amended 
(Amendment and Revision of Ordinance No. 1-9 
of 2013), are unenforceable as preempted by state 
law;  
e. Section 5(a) of the Highland Community Bill Of 
Rights Ordinance is, on its face, unconstitutional 
(under both the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania); 
f. Section 6 of the Highland Community Bill Of 
Rights Ordinance is, on its face, unconstitutional 
(under both the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania); 
g. Section 7 of the Highland Community Bill Of 
Rights Ordinance is, on its face, unconstitutional 
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Township and the Board of Supervisors withdrew their 
objection to Seneca’s DEP permit applications and 
withdrew their counterclaims, and Seneca withdrew its 
counterclaims against the Township and the Board of 
Supervisors.  App.389–90 (Stipulation and Consent 
Decree) ¶ 13(i)–(l).  The parties also requested that the 
Court “adopt . . . as its findings and opinion regarding the 
merits of Seneca’s claims” the parties’ stipulations about 
why specific parts of the Community Bill of Rights were 
unlawful.  See App.390 (Stipulation and Consent Decree) 
¶ 16. 
That same day, the District Court entered an order 
designated as the final judgment.  The order adopted 
Paragraph 13(a)–(g) of the Consent Decree as the Court’s 
findings and opinion.  Paragraph 13(a)–(g) were the 
portions of the Consent Decree that concluded that much 
of the Community Bill of Rights was unenforceable. 
On August 15, 2016, Appellants filed a motion for 
reconsideration of final judgment arguing that the 
                                                                                              
 
(under both the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania); . . . . 
App.388–89 (Stipulation and Consent Decree) ¶ 13(a)–
(g).  
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Township and the Board of Supervisors were not 
considering the long-term interests in clean water, that 
Appellants had rights to be parties in the case, and that 
Appellants would have participated in settlement 
negotiations. 
On August 16, 2016, the District Court denied 
Appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the denial of 
their motion to intervene.  Before ruling on the motion to 
intervene in this case, the District Court denied 
intervention in a similar case, Pennsylvania General 
Energy Co., LLC v. Grant Township, No. 14-cv-
209ERIE, 2015 WL 6002163 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2015).  
In Pennsylvania General Energy, we affirmed the denial 
of the motion to intervene in a nonprecedential order.  
Without addressing changed circumstances or 
Appellants’ new arguments in this case, the District 
Court explained that our affirmance in Pennsylvania 
General Energy gave it confidence in its original 
decision to deny intervention to Appellants.  See 
App.022–23 (Order).   
That same day, the District Court denied 
Appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the order 
approving the Consent Decree because the Appellants 
were not parties. 
On September 12, 2016, Appellants appealed the 
following: the March 29, 2016 order denying the motion 
to intervene; the August 16, 2016 order denying the 
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motion to reconsider the order denying the motion to 
intervene; the August 12, 2016 final order adopting the 
Consent Decree; and the August 16, 2016 memorandum 
opinion denying reconsideration of the adoption of the 
Consent Decree. 
Although litigation in the District Court relating to 
the Community Bill of Rights has concluded, a second, 
very similar case is now before the same District Court.  
On November 8, 2016, the Township adopted a Home 
Rule Charter that prevented Seneca from storing fracking 
waste in Highland.7  See Compl. ¶ 1, Seneca Res. Corp. 
v. Highland Township, No. 16-289 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 
2016), ECF No. 1; see also See Compl. Ex. A § 401, No. 
16-289 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016), ECF No. 1-1 (“It shall 
be unlawful within Highland Township for any 
corporation or government to engage in the depositing of 
waste from oil and gas extraction.”).  In response to the 
                                           
 
7 The Home Rule Charter was apparently passed in a 
popular vote, 55% to 45%, with 94 citizens turning out.  
See Katie Weidenboerner, Highland Township Votes in 
Home Rule Charter, Courier Express (DuBois, Pa.) (Nov. 
9, 2016), 
http://www.thecourierexpress.com/news/local/highland-
township-votes-in-home-rule-charter/article_833142ae-
b155-55fa-8477-5864bde37281.html. 
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Home Rule Charter, Seneca brought a separate lawsuit 
against the Township and the Board of Supervisors.  In 
that litigation, two of the Appellants—Citizens 
Advocating a Clean Healthy Environment, Inc., and the 
Crystal Spring Ecosystem—have moved to intervene. 
JURISDICTION 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  Appellants claim we have 
appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  As discussed below, 
fatal standing or mootness problems prevent us from 
taking appellate jurisdiction except to the extent that we 
hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration of 
the order denying intervention.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our “continuing obligation” to assure that we have 
jurisdiction requires that we raise issues of standing and 
mootness sua sponte.  Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 
482 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Chong v. Dist. 
Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2001).  We assess 
our own appellate jurisdiction in the first instance.  Cf. 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington 
Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 475 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“We exercise de novo review over legal conclusions 
concerning standing and mootness.”). 
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We review denials of motions for reconsideration 
of denials of motions for intervention as of right under a 
“more stringent” abuse of discretion review.  Harris v. 
Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987); see 
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 
F.3d 240, 245 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Because an appeal 
from a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration brings up 
the underlying judgment for review, the standard of 
review varies with the nature of the underlying 
judgment.” (quoting McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 
F.2d 55, 552–53 (3d Cir. 1992))); Kleissler v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We will reverse 
a district court’s determination on a motion to intervene 
as of right if the court has abused its discretion by 
applying an improper legal standard or reaching a 
conclusion we are confident is incorrect.” (citing Harris, 
820 F.2d at 597)). 
ANALYSIS 
There are two sets of rulings Appellants dispute: 
(1) two rulings on motions relating to intervention and 
(2) two rulings on motions relating to the Consent 
Decree.  The second set is linked to the first because, to 
appeal rulings related to the Consent Decree, Appellants 
must, among other things, be “part[ies] . . . aggrieved by 
the district court’s judgment.”  Armotek Indus., Inc. v. 
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 759 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1991) (emphasis omitted).  Appellants are not parties.   
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Appellants contend that they should have been 
parties because the District Court should have granted 
their motion to intervene.  Their main claim to intervene 
in the District Court and their only claim in their opening 
brief here relates to their interest in defending the 
Community Bill of Rights.  Because the Community Bill 
of Rights has been repealed, this argument is moot.8  In a 
                                           
 
8 Were we to reach the merits of the issue as to whether 
Appellants could intervene to defend the ordinance, we 
would have serious doubts that the Township of 
Highland’s decision to seek a settlement made them 
inadequate representatives of the Appellants’ interests.  
We have repeatedly stated that a party is entitled to settle 
its lawsuit without inviting intervenors where settlement 
is the only reasonable course of action.  See, e.g., Brody 
ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123–24 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“The contention that the school officials have 
not actively litigated this case must be rejected as a basis 
for finding inadequate representation. . . .  Defendants are 
fully entitled to choose to negotiate a consent decree 
rather than litigate the case on the merits.”); 
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(“Even if the injunction had been characterized as a 
consent decree, inadequate representation would not be 
established ipso facto; any case, even the most vigorously 
defended, may culminate in a consent decree.  As the 
Seventh Circuit has observed, a consent decree may be 
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simply ‘the inescapable legal consequence of application 
of fundamental law to [the] facts.  That [intervenors] 
would have been less prone to agree to the facts and 
would have taken a different view of the applicable law 
does not mean that the [defendants] did not adequately 
represent their interests in the litigation.’” (quoting 
United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 466 F.2d 573, 575 
(7th Cir. 1972))). 
At oral argument, Appellants’ counsel essentially 
conceded that the Amended Ordinance was unlawful 
under existing law: 
THE COURT:  You would agree, wouldn’t 
you, that there are some portions of the 
Amended Ordinance here that clearly were 
unlawful? 
COUNSEL: Your Honor, those are the 
issues that we’d like to litigate before the 
Court but unfortunately we 
[UNINTELLIGIBLE]— 
THE COURT: You think that there’s an 
arguable position to be taken that there was 
no preemption in some of the laws here. 
23 
 
sentence in their reply brief and at length at oral 
argument, Appellants argued they should be able to 
intervene to challenge the District Court’s adoption of 
Paragraph 13(a)–(g) of the Consent Decree.  Appellants 
argue that the District Court could not adopt findings and 
holdings to which the parties agreed.  Because the 
Consent Decree does not bind Appellants or deprive 
them of rights, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying their motion for reconsideration of 
the denial of intervention to challenge those aspects of 
the Consent Decree.   
                                                                                              
 
COUNSEL: Your Honor, that would be like 
being in 1907 and arguing against Lochner. 
THE COURT: Taking away corporation’s 
personhood?   
COUNSEL: Again, that would be like being 
in 1900, arguing against separate but equal.  
So, yes, we’re challenging corporate 
constitutional rights, making a good faith 
claim for changing the law. 
Oral Arg. at 8:20 (emphasis added).   
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Finally, because Appellants cannot intervene for 
either of the two reasons they advanced for intervention, 
they lack standing to challenge the Consent Decree.   
I. APPELLANTS CANNOT INTERVENE 
Appellants cannot intervene either to save the 
ordinance or to challenge the adoption of the Consent 
Decree. 
A. Intervention To Defend the Ordinance Is Moot 
“The doctrine of mootness requires that ‘an actual 
controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 
merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”  Brown v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & 
Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985)).   
The party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden 
to show the case is moot.  See Burns v. PA Dep’t of 
Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Such lack of 
specificity, along with the fact that the Department of 
Corrections urges us to refrain from vacating the 
favorable decision entered by the District Court, counsels 
against the conclusion that the Appellees have met the 
‘“heavy,” even “formidable” burden’ that a party alleging 
mootness must bear.” (quoting United States v. Gov’t of 
V.I., 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004))). 
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After the party asserting mootness bears that 
burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing mootness 
to explain why the case is not moot.  See Richardson v. 
Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 283 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Richardson has not carried his burden of showing that 
he fits into either the ‘capable of repetition yet evading 
review’ or the ‘inherently transitory’ exceptions to 
mootness.”).   
On August 10, 2016, the Board repealed the 
ordinance that Appellants wanted to defend.  Appellants 
originally stated that their purpose for seeking to 
intervene was to defend the Community Bill of Rights.  
Appellants have never argued that this Court could revive 
the Community Bill of Rights or that Appellants had any 
right to prevent the repeal.  Cf. Util. Contractors Ass’n of 
N.J., Inc. v. Toops, 507 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1974) (“In 
the absence of this lawsuit, had any of the municipalities 
chosen voluntarily to change its building code, the 
appellants’ monetary interests would not have conferred 
legal standing to prevent such governmental action.”).  
Therefore, Appellees have met their burden of showing 
Appellants’ defense of the Community Bill of Rights 
would be moot. 
Appellants raise three defenses to mootness: (1) 
that the intervention issue is “capable of repetition yet 
evading review”; (2) that this lawsuit is a matter of 
“public interest”; and (3) that we can ignore mootness 
26 
 
because “the resolution on the merits” of the intervention 
issue “is clear.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. 5–7.  All of these 
fail.  Therefore, Appellants cannot carry their burden to 
explain why the case is not moot.   
First, the issue here does not “evade review.”  An 
issue evades review when the issue cannot be resolved in 
time to fully contest the challenged action.  See 
Richardson, 829 F.3d at 283 n.4 (“Richardson has not 
shown . . . that the amount of time an inmate spends in 
the SMU Program is typically so brief as to evade review 
by becoming moot before a District Court can rule on 
class certification.”).  Appellants argue that they are 
unable to get a court ruling on their motions to intervene 
in subsequent litigation because a case could become 
moot before any ruling is issued.  For instance, Appellees 
could settle the Home Rule Charter litigation, Seneca 
Res. Corp. v. Highland Township, No. 16-289 (W.D. 
Pa.), before the District Court rules on the motion to 
intervene in that case.  Appellees’ argument is 
speculative at best.  There is enough time for the District 
Court to rule on CACHE and the Ecosystem’s motion to 
intervene in the Home Rule Charter litigation.  See, e.g., 
County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 
534 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The District Court conducted 
hearings on an expedited basis and rendered an opinion 
in time to guide the parties’ conduct during that event.  
With respect to any dispute that might arise in connection 
with future Independence Day activities, the parties, if 
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unable to resolve their differences, would have ample 
opportunity to bring a new lawsuit and to develop a 
record reflective of the particular circumstances attendant 
on that dispute.”).  Thus, the issue is not so fleeting as to 
evade review.   
Second, Appellants cite a dated, out-of-circuit case 
for the proposition that the public interest in the 
resolution of a case can be an exception to mootness.  See 
Alton & S. Ry. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 463 F.2d 
872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“But when the particular 
controversy has expired, so that there is no duty or 
obligation of the court to maintain the appeal, an 
application of the doctrine permitting maintenance of 
appeals of recurring controversies in cases of public 
interest necessarily identifies judicial latitude.”).  That 
case also appears to be about the “capable of repetition 
yet evading review” exception.  See id. at 878 (“[T]here 
is a strong counter-current of doctrine under which the 
court continues an appeal in existence, notwithstanding 
the lapse in time of the particular decree or controversy, 
when the court discerns a likelihood of recurrence of the 
same issue, generally in the framework of a ‘continuing’ 
or ‘recurring’ controversy, and “public interest” in 
maintaining the appeal.”).  Were that case to stand for a 
broader “public interest” principle, it would not avail 
Appellants.  The Third Circuit has never adopted a 
standalone public interest exception to mootness.  See 
N.J. Turnpike Auth., 772 F.2d at 30 (“Although we 
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recognize that the substantive issues are of considerable 
public interest, we believe that this alone does not impart 
Article III justiciability when there is ‘no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’” (quoting 
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 
(1953))); Campbell Soup Co. v. Martin, 202 F.2d 398, 
399 (3d Cir. 1953) (“[E]ven if this were a subject of 
public interest we do not think that the exception [to 
mootness] could be applied in a federal court.”).   
Third, Appellants argue that we can ignore 
mootness when “the resolution on the merits is clear.”  
Appellants’ Reply Br. 6 (quoting Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of 
Parole, 543 F.2d 240, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)).  But “[u]nder Article III of the 
Constitution, this Court has no authority to give opinions 
upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to 
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 
matter in issue in the case before it.”  Whiting v. 
Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 
2012) (explaining that we cannot opine on a case over 
which we have no jurisdiction).  Thus, even were the 
resolution of Appellants’ original intervention motion 
glaringly obvious, we cannot rule on it because it is 
moot.   
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Denying the Appellants’ Motion To Intervene To 
Challenge the Consent Decree 
Perhaps recognizing that they could no longer rely 
on their interests in defending the Community Bill of 
Rights, Appellants now focus heavily on the District 
Court’s adoption of part of Paragraph 13 of the Consent 
Decree as the basis for their right to intervene.9  The 
District Court “adopt[ed] as its findings, and as the 
opinion and order of this Court, those matters stipulated 
to in ¶¶13(a)-(g) of the Stipulation and Consent Decree.”  
App.021 (Order, Seneca Res. Corp. v. Highland 
Township, No. 1:15-cv-60-SPB (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 
                                           
 
9 Appellants raised the issue that they should have been 
allowed to intervene because the District Court lacked 
power to adopt the Consent Decree for the first time 
before us in their reply brief.  See Appellants’ Reply Br. 
8.  As such, we need not consider it.  See, e.g., Issa v. 
Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 139 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2017) (explaining that we could ignore an argument 
raised fleetingly in the district court and for the first time 
before us in a reply brief).  We do so because Appellants’ 
interest in the Consent Decree is an issue of law and their 
concerns about ultra vires district court action are 
important.   
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2016), ECF No. 84).  In turn, Paragraph 13(a)–(g) stated 
that the parties “stipulate and agree” that various sections 
of the Community Bill of Rights were invalid for various 
reasons.  App.388–89 (Stipulation and Consent Decree) 
¶ 13(a)–(g). 
Appellants now claim that they must be allowed to 
intervene because the portion of the District Court’s 
order that adopted Paragraph 13(a)–(g) “establish[es] . . . 
the legality or illegality of [Appellants’] protected 
rights.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. 8.  More specifically, 
Appellants argue that the District Court lacked the power 
to enter that order because the parties were no longer 
adverse to each other when the Consent Decree was 
adopted.   
We cannot reach that argument because the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellants’ motion to reconsider the order denying their 
motion to intervene.  Appellants do not have a legally 
protectable interest in the purportedly substantive 
elements of the Consent Decree sufficient to allow them 
to intervene to argue that the case was moot when the 
Consent Decree was adopted.   
“To justify intervention as of right, the applicant 
must have an interest ‘relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action’ that is 
‘significantly protectable.’”  Kleissler v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
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Donaldson v. United States, 417 U.S. 517, 531 (1971), 
superseded on other grounds by 26 U.S.C. § 7609 as 
stated in Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 
310, 316 (1985)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).  “It is 
not sufficient that the claim be incidentally affected; 
rather, there must be ‘a tangible threat’ to the applicant’s 
legal interest. . . .  [T]his factor may be satisfied if, for 
example, a determination of the action in the [proposed 
intervenors’] absence will have a significant stare decisis 
effect on their claims, or if the [proposed intervenors’] 
rights may be affected by a proposed remedy.”  Brody ex 
rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citation omitted) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 820 
F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 226–27 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
The Consent Decree does not establish Appellants’ 
legal rights.  Were Appellants to find themselves in a 
position to argue the merits of the Community Bill of 
Rights (or a law like the Community Bill of Rights), 
Appellants would not be barred by (1) estoppel, (2) stare 
decisis, (3) judicial consequences of the Consent Decree, 
or (4) any contractual consequences largely because 
Appellants were not parties to the Consent Decree.  
Because the Consent Decree does not—and cannot—
affect Appellants’ rights, the District Court did not abuse 
it discretion in denying Appellants’ motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to intervene. 
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First, there are no estoppel consequences to 
Appellants here because Appellants were not parties to 
this case and have not had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate any issue regarding the merits of the case.  See, 
e.g., Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 175 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“For defensive collateral estoppel—a form of 
non-mutual issue preclusion—to apply, the party to be 
precluded must have had a ‘full and fair’ opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the first action.” (quoting Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328, 332 (1979)); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 
47, 50–51 (Pa. 2005) (requiring “the party against whom 
the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party 
in the prior case” and “the party or person privy to the 
party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding”).  Therefore, the District Court’s declaration 
does not estop any party from defending the Ordinance 
except potentially the Township and the Board of 
Supervisors.   
Second, stare decisis does not affect Appellants 
here because “[a] decision of a federal district court judge 
is not binding precedent in either a different judicial 
district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same 
judge in a different case.”  Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 
692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 James W. Moore et al., 
Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011)); 
accord Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, --- F.3d ---, 2017 WL 
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2836808, at *8 (3d Cir. July 3, 2017); see also Threadgill 
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is clear that there is no such thing as ‘the 
law of the district.’”); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 
900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“The decree may be scrutinized by the judge 
for fairness prior to his approval, but there is no contest 
or decision on the merits of the issues underlying the 
lawsuit.  Such a decree binds the signatories, but cannot 
be used as a shield against all future suits by nonparties 
seeking to challenge conduct that may or may not be 
governed by the decree.”). 
Third, there are no judicial consequences to 
Appellants flowing from the Consent Decree.  That is, 
Appellants could not be held in contempt for violating 
the Consent Decree because, on its face, “the consent 
decree here does not bind [Appellants] to do or not to do 
anything, nor does it impose any legal obligations on 
[Appellants].”  Johnson v. Lodge #93 of the Fraternal 
Order of Police, 393 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2004).10   
                                           
 
10 For this reason, even if Appellants were parties, they 
would lack standing to challenge the consent decree.  
“The general rule is that a nonsettling party has no 
standing to appeal a consent decree which does not bind 
him and interferes with no legal relationship between the 
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Fourth, there are no contractual consequences of 
the Consent Decree for Appellants.  “[U]nder 
Pennsylvania law, a consent decree is an agreement only 
between parties and does not bind or preclude the claims 
                                                                                              
 
nonsettling party and the settling parties, even though the 
nonsettling party may have sustained some economic loss 
as a result of the consent decree.”  Milonas v. Williams, 
691 F.2d 931, 944 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Util. 
Contractors Ass’n of N.J., Inc. v. Toops, 507 F.2d 83 (3d 
Cir. 1974)); see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 
1330, 1332 (3d Cir. 1990) (“To establish standing to 
appeal a settlement, a non-settling defendant may not 
merely claim an interest in the lawsuit but must show 
some cognizable prejudice to a legal relationship between 
it and the settling parties.”). 
We have held that intervenors do not need to show 
Article III standing where a party on the same side has 
Article III standing, see King v. Governor of N.J., 767 
F.3d 216, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
King v. Christie, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015), but “an 
intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the 
party on whose side intervention was permitted is 
contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he 
fulfills the requirements of Art. III,” Diamond v. Charles, 
476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986). 
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of non-parties.”  Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 
171, 181 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Sabatine v. 
Commonwealth, 442 A.2d 210 (Pa. 1981)).11  Appellants 
are nonparties. 
Because the Consent Decree does not impair 
Appellants’ ability to protect any interest they may have 
in defending laws like the Community Bill of Rights, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
                                           
 
11 Therefore, if the consent decree did encroach on 
Appellants’ rights, they could bring a collateral attack.  
See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763–65 (1989) 
(holding that allowing collateral attacks by nonparties on 
consent decrees was a “principle” that was 
“incorporat[ed]” into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure), superseded by statute for Title VII purposes 
as recognized in United States v. City of Detroit, 712 
F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. 
City of New York, 198 F.3d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“Those who are not parties to a consent decree are free 
to challenge the decree and actions taken under it.” 
(citing Martin, 490 U.S. at 762); Interfaith Cmty. Org. 
Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 296, 313 n.22 
(D.N.J. 2010) (“It appears the general principle 
underlying Wilks remains . . . .”). 
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motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to 
intervene. 
II. APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE CONSENT DECREE 
Because Appellants were not permitted to 
intervene, they did not become parties to this lawsuit.  
Because Appellants are not parties to this lawsuit, they 
may not challenge the Consent Decree.  See, e.g., Brody 
ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 
1992) (noting that the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal 
of a consent decree by attempted intervenors for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction and citing Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 
530 F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir. 1976), for the proposition that 
an “appellant must have been granted permission to 
intervene in order to appeal merits of case”); cf. Diamond 
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63–64 (1986) (“By not 
appealing the judgment below, the State indicated its 
acceptance of that decision, and its lack of interest in 
defending its own statute.  The State’s general interest 
may be adverse to the interests of appellees, but its 
failure to invoke our jurisdiction leaves the Court without 
a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ between [intervenor-]appellees 
and the State of Illinois.” (footnote omitted)); Halle v. W. 
Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that, for purposes of appeal, 
Appellants were no longer ‘parties’ to the case after they 
were dismissed without prejudice from Halle’s 
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proceeding.  Appellants therefore cannot pursue an 
appeal from Steven Halle’s individual judgment.” 
(citation omitted)). 
Appellants focus on the fact that we have held that 
we lacked jurisdiction over an appeal on the merits when 
an appellant is “properly denied the status of intervenor.”  
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(emphasis added).  They argued that because they were 
improperly denied the right to intervene, these holdings 
do not apply to them.  Because, as we held above, 
Appellants were not improperly denied the right to 
intervene, Appellants’ argument fails.  We have no 
appellate jurisdiction to review the Consent Decree.   
CONCLUSION 
Appellants’ motion to intervene is moot.  The 
District Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration 
of the order denying Appellants’ motion to intervene was 
not an abuse of discretion.  Therefore, Appellants are 
nonparties and lack standing to challenge the Consent 
Decree.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court relating to the denial of the motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of intervention and dismiss 
the remainder of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
